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Should Judges Be Politicians?:
The English Experiencet
GARETH JONES*
In these lectures I shall try to explain the role of the English judge
in the British Constitution. I shall take as a striking demonstration of
that muted role the judicial interpretation of politically sensitive legislation, which interpretation is characterized by extreme deference to the
words of an Act of Parliament. This will lead me to speculate on whether
the sovereign powers of Parliament should be curtailed by the enactment
of a Bill of Rights and whether a Bill of Rights is a political and legal
possibility. If it is, what form should it take? Finally, even if it were
enacted, would it be a lead balloon since its interpretation would be in
the hands of a judiciary that will not attempt to escape from its past?
But first, a little history; England's problems cannot be understood without
it.
"When, if at all, should judges step into the political arena?" is a question which has been a constant source of fascination for successive generations of jurists.' The Supreme Court of the United States has
demonstrated that, when the mood takes it, it can indeed be a legislator.
In England the powers of the courts are necessarily more limited. England
has no written constitution and no entrenched Bill of Rights. The Crown
is a constitutional monarch and our legislature wholly sovereign. The
T This is an edited version of the Addison C.Harris Memorial Lecture presented April
9-10, 1981, at Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington. Events since April 1981
have been briefly noted.
* M.A. 1953, LL.D. 1952, University of Cambridge; LL.M. 1954, F.B.A. 1982, Harvard
University. Downing Professor of the Laws of England in the University of Cambridge.
I J. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1955), is the most
comprehensive discussion.
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legislature is bicameral, but its upper house, the nonelected House of
Lords, has only a limited power to delay the enactment of legislation which
has been approved in a democratically elected House of Commons. The
House of Commons appears to be all powerful; in practice it has become
the vassal of the executive-the Cabinet-drawn from the majority party.
The third power, the English judiciary, is "above" politics-a dependent
of no political party. But that independence may have a hollow ring, for
judges have sworn to execute faithfully the commands of the democratically elected sovereign.
In the early seventeenth century, English judges might have accepted
certain fundamental and natural laws, given by God, that were sacrosanct
and immune from destruction or attrition by the acta of the King in Parliament. They were not to do so. Yet two or more centuries were to pass
before it was seen that there could be a conflict between legislative will
and judicial responsibility. Blackstone, writing his Commentaries between
1765 and 1769, accepted the reality of a Parliament so powerful that it
could make a man a woman and a woman a man and, at the same time,
the existence of natural, common law rights which were absolute and
immutable.' Like his greater mentor Mansfield, Blackstone never saw,
or at least did not acknowledge, the absurdity of that antithesis. He and
his contemporaries could not conceive that Parliament would ever encroach on the fundamental rights of Englishmen-the rights of personal
security, liberty, and (particularly) property-which the judges, he claimed,
the oracles of the law, had so jealously guarded against the "wild and
absurd" claims of Stuart monarchs, the exponents of the divine right of
kings.3 That encroachment was yet to come. The Old Whigs saw the courts
as the guardians of the individual's natural rights and held those rights
superior to the collectivist interests of the State. This was a political
powder keg, as any student of the history of the United States Supreme
Court well knows (the Four Horsemen can claim to be Blackstone's
American disciples); a powder keg which in twentieth century England
has been successfully, or too successfully, defused.
If there was thought to be perfect harmony between the different
organs of government in Blackstone's England, that harmony did not survive unscathed the political and industrial revolution of Victorian England.
The nineteenth century saw the growth of a substantial body of legislation (such as the Workman's Compensation Statutes) which may fairly
be described as "collectivist" but which did not consciously plan to
regulate, in any grand sense, the day to day affairs of the community.
It was the judges, of course, who had to interpret that legislation, which

See 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
1 See id. at *69, *209.
2

COMMENTARIES

*123-26, *160-62.
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they did, if not with hostility, at least with a lack of sympathy. During
this period they so read the precedents of the preceding century as to
make preeminent the so-called literal or grammatical rule of interpretation.' This required them to glean the meaning of the statute from its
words alone and forbade them to consider any extrinsic evidence whatsoever to elucidate the meaning. As early as 1875 one witness before a House
of Commons Committee thought that they had done so for a purpose and
stated that "it is obvious that there is a sort of antagonism between the
courts and the Legislature, and that the judges are not unwilling to exerin drawing
cise their criticial faculty, and sometimes very severely ....
the fang-teeth of an Act of Parliament." Sir Frederick Pollock, no radical,
considered that some of the statutory rules of interpretation could be
explained only "on the theory that Parliament generally changes the law
for the worse, and that the business of the judges is to keep the mischief
of its interference within the narrowest possible bounds."" Statute law
was alien law, and Blackstone's credo, that the common law was incomparably more perfect than statute law whose innovations were at the root
of so many intricacies and delays,7 was to become part of the juristic
philosophy, consciously and unconsciously imbibed, of successive generations of English lawyers.
It is not surprising that true radicals, inspired by Bentham's polemical
criticisms, regarded the judiciary as the enemy of any reform and that
the trade unionists' picture of the courts was that of the Tory Party in
whig and gown." Judges were (and are) drawn from a narrow social class,
and judicial appointments were in the nineteenth century (but no longer
are) the reward of faithful political service. By the end of the nineteenth
century the bench was heavily Conservative. Lord Halsbury, three times
Lord Chancellor over a period of over seventeen years, was a particularly influential partisan, earning a sharp rebuke from his own Prime
Minister, Lord Salisbury: "The judicial salad requires both legal oil and
political vinegar; but disastrous effects will follow if due proportion is
not observed."9 The formative case law in which Halsbury's appointees
restrictively interpreted trade union and social welfare legislation earned
the judiciary the hostility "not just of Socialists, but of trade unionists

' See, e.g., River Wear Comm'rs v. Adamson, 2 App. Cas. 743, 764 (1877) (Lord Blackburn,
dissenting).
5 HearingsBefore the Select Committee of the House of Commons (1875) (testimony of Mr.
Reilly).

I F. POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 85 (1882).
7 See, e.g., 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *365; 4 id. at *18.

8 See generally Kahn-Freund, Labour Law, in LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND IN THE 20TH
CENTURY 215-63 (M. Ginsberg ed. 1959); H. PELLING, Trade Unions, Workers and the Law, in
POPULAR POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN LATE VICTORIAN BRITAIN 62-81 (1968).
9 Quoted in R.F.V. HEUSTON, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS 57 (1964). See also Robson,

Industrial Law, 51 L.Q.

REV.

195, 202-05 (1935).
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who were otherwise the mildest of Liberals."1 It is easy to lose a sense
of perspective and proportion in reproducing such criticisms which related
only to a segment of the work of the judiciary. The judges' daily bread
was still "rich" common law bread which manual workers rarely broke.
For that negative reason trade unionists were not mollified by the example of judicial fair-mindedness and craftsmanship in the development of
the "pure" common law.
The interwar years did not change attitudes. The English judiciary was
epitomized, its critics thought, in the person of the Lord Chief Justice,
Lord Hewart. In 1928 Hewart wrote The New Despotism1' which expressed
his fear that the "rule of law" was in danger of being subverted by unbridled administrative regulation. Judges were under a duty to read the
language of statutes restrictively if such statutes attempted to erode fundamental rights (particularly, the right of personal property) and to exclude the jurisdiction of His Majesty's courts. Once again it was through
the rigorous application of the literal rule of statutory interpretation that
English judges could be faithful to their heritage and protect individual
rights from erosion by "alien" collectivist legislation. English judges could
not be and can never be as effective as the Supreme Court of the United
States, with its self-created power to declare congressional legislation unconstitutional, in frustrating the legislative will. But some vociferous critics
naively thought they were; and disparagingly compared them with
Brandeis and Holmes, perhaps forgetting that they were the great
dissenters. Prominent among the critics was Harold Laski. In his
ParliamentaryGovernment in England, he wrote:
They [the judges] do not appear to consider that Parliament may have
good reason for the decisions it has chosen to make. They do not appear to consider, either, that the grounds for those decisions may lie,
in fact, in the very habits of the judges themselves. The whole ethos
of their approach is one of hostility to the process of modern administration. They interpret the "rule of law" as though they are
themselves the masters of a "higher law" than that of a sovereign
legislature the consent of which they themselves determine and the
particular relevance of which they themselves decide. It is at least
not excessive to say that they bring to the interpretation of the modern
State and its processes habits of interpretation which, at least by implication, deny the validity of many of the ends to which its power
is devoted. 2
Exactly as the Supreme Court of the United States made itself, above
all in its hostility to the New Deal of President Roosevelt, a kind of
super-legislature engaged in the enunciation of political doctrine under
H. PELLING, supranote 8, at 80. See also Jennings, JudicialProcess at its Worst, 1 MOD.
REV. 111 (1937).
" G. HEWART, THE NEW DESPOTISM (1928).
12 H. LASKI, PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND 368 (1959).
"

L.
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guise of legal procedure, so the High Court in this country is engaged
in a similar task. Its opportunities, of course, are smaller here; it cannot forthrightly annul an Act of Parliament. But it is at least willing
to build up a kind of Fourteenth Amendment in this country, and to
use it as fully as it can to set a barrier across the road of any social
change which interferes with individual rights of which it happens
to approve. Latent in this attitude is a potential conflict between
Courts and Parliament of which the result would be the immersion
of the judges in political controversy. They would not emerge unscathed from that experience.1 3

Much of that criticism may have been overstated; and Laski himself
said that he never doubted the integrity of those whom he castigated,
although at times that is hard to believe. Laski believed that judicial conservatism was a stumbling block in the way of social progress. So did
many others who could not be accused of sharing his political faith. In
a public lecture in 1935 a distinguished parliamentary draughtsman, Sir
William Graham-Harrison, reflected the views of Members of Parliament
of all political hues and many civil servants when he caustically described
the judicial approach to the interpretation of statutes in the following
words:
We find that when an Act comes before a Court it is quite often
held to mean something which we never intended, and we are told
that this interpretation is inevitable, in view of well-established rules
applicable to the construction of Statutes; it seems to us, however,
that these results are arrived at by subtleties and an excessive ingeniousness of argument which are out of place in construing legal
documents prepared as Acts of Parliament necessarily are. More than
that, we feel that the Courts are not altogether sympathetic to our
objects and that they take rather a pleasure in showing how much
cleverer they are than we are, and how ridiculous our statutes are;
and we think it rather unfair that the judges should say such unpleasant things about us, while our mouths are stopped from saying what
we think of them."
English civil servants and politicians have never loved lawyers, who
have rarely gained the ear of the House of Commons. Certainly the courts'
interpretation of welfare statutes in the pre-World War II years left the
Labour Party deeply distrustful of the judiciary and led that party to
resolve that when it came to power it would exclude the courts from the
review of its legislation. Between 1945 and 1950 a Labour controlled Parlia-

ment did just that. In 1946, Aneurin Bevan, the Labour Minister of Health,
issued a solemn warning in the debate on the legislation which was to
create the National Health Service; he proclaimed that the Labour Government would not tolerate the judicial sabotage of its welfare legisla'* Id. at 371-72. See also H. LASKI, STUDIES IN LAW AND POLITICS 219-21 (1932).
*dGraham-Harrison, An Examination of the Main Criticisms of the Statute Book and of
the Possibility of Improvement, 1935 J. Soc'Y PUB. TCHRS. L. 9, 34-35.
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tion."5 So legislation was drafted in an attempt to exclude any possibility of
judicial scrutiny. Was there a confrontation?
Bevan's admonitory words did not fall on stony ground. Quite the contrary. Reading the immediate postwar cases one has a sense that the
judges drank too deeply from Aneurin's bitter cup and accepted too readily
Laski's colourful indictment of the sins of their predecessors. They became
overtly deferential towards the legislature and anxiously avoided intruding
into its sacred domain. If they were to act otherwise they would jeopardize their "independence," a possession which they prized above all. And
yet their ready acceptance of the exclusion of their jurisdiction to review
executive and administrative acts that curtailed individual rights made
that independence somewhat inconsequential. One example must suffice:
Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council. 6 By statute, a landowner at
that time had six weeks to apply to the High Court to question the validity
of any compulsory purchase (eminent domain) order." After that time the
order "shall not.., be questioned in any legal proceedings whatsoever." 8
The appellant brought an action more than six weeks after the confirmation of the order claiming, inter alia, a declaration that the order was
made and confirmed wrongfully and in bad faith. 9 The House of Lords
held that the jurisdiction of the courts was ousted by the language of
the statute. "[P]lain words must be given their plain meaning."2 An aggrieved person could not even question the validity of the order on the
ground that it was made or confirmed in bad faith. Their lordships comforted themselves with the thought that an aggrieved person had a personal action for damages against any official who had acted in bad faith,
even though he could never recover his land which had been acquired
through that act of bad faith.
The years 1955-1970 saw some retreat from Smith v. East Elloe and
a greater readiness to question administrative decisions which statute
had described as "final and conclusive."" Prominent among these was
Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign CompensationCommission,' recently described
as a "legal landmark."' A statute provided that the determination of the
Foreign Compensation Commission "shall not be called in question in any
court of law."' The House of Lords held that those words did not prevent recourse to the courts to determine whether the Commission had

'5

B. ABEL-SMITH & R. STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS 285 (1968).

[19561 A.C. 736.
17Id.
"Id.
, Id. at 738.
21

2

Id. at 751 (Viscount Simonds).
For an analysis, see H.W.R. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 577-90 (4th ed. 1977).
[1969] 2 A.C. 147 (1968).
In re Racal Communications Ltd., [1980] 2 All E.R. 634, 638 (Lord Diplock).
[19691 2 A.C. at 148.
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exceeded the limits set by Parliament to its jurisdiction. On the facts
the Commission had purported to take into account a factor which they
were not entitled to take into account. Any error of law or fact or administrative policy which led an administrative tribunal to ask the wrong
question made its decision a nullity. In reaching this decision three
members of the House of Lords were highly critical of Smith v. East Elloe.1
Anisminic was not in fact a significant challenge to the dominant
political and executive will, although some commentators have looked on
that case as a repudiation of judicial pusillanimity and a recognition of
a greater willingness to question administrative decisions. Indeed, Lord
Wilberforce denied that it should be seen as representing a power struggle between the courts and the executive. That was to come dramatically with Mr. Heath's ill-fated Industrial Relations Act of 1971, which
created an Industrial Court and sought to solve industrial disputes through
the imposition of legal sanctions. Judges were sucked into the battles
between employers and employees, as they had been in the trade union
cases at the beginning of the century; and they emerged hurt and bruised.
It is beyond the scope of this lecture to trace the stormy history of
the National Industrial Relations Court (N.I.R.C.). From the outset, the
unions regarded its jurisdiction with distaste and campaigned for its abolition. Its presiding judge, Sir John Donaldson, was subjected to hostile
criticism and abuse. It was inevitable that the court's exercise of its power
to sequestrate assets (including funds ear marked for benevolent purposes)
and its threat to commit individuals for contempt of its decisions
strengthened the conviction of its critics that judges as a class were Tory
acolytes, who thoroughly approved of the objects of the 1971 legislation
and welcomed the opportunity to castrate the powers of the unions. On
more than one occasion, mass trade union defiance of the court's injunctions was only narrowly averted.Y The tone of some of these criticisms
was more intemperate and less intelligent than Laski's in the 1930's: the
judges were "little Conservatives" from the cradle to the judicial grave,
and their middle class prejudices, if innate, led them to question only
the legislation of the Socialists and never that of the Tories. Ironically,
the repeal of the legislation and the consequent demise of the N.I.R.C.
was welcomed by both employers and unions who were united in the view
that the courts were not the appropriate forum to resolve industrial
disputes. Not surprisingly, Sir John Donaldson disagreed.' He repudiated
charges that the N.I.R.C. was prejudiced and partisan and lamented the
I See id. at 170-71 (Lord Reid); id. at 181 (Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest); id. at 200-01
(Lord Pearce).
Id. at 208 (Lord Wilberforce).
See, e.g., The Times (London), July 12, 1972, at 2, col. 3 (describing the events surrounding the picketing of the Midland Cold Storage Co.); id. July 22, 1972, at 21, col. 1 (same);
id. July 28, 1972, at 7, col. 1 (same).
" Donaldson, Lessons from the Industrial Court, 91 L.Q. REV. 181 (1975).
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opportunity that was lost to introduce some of Mr. Herbert Wechsler's

"neutral principles" into English labour and constitutional law.'
This history of troubled labour relations, centering around the role and
powers of the trade unions, appeared to drive judges into two different
camps: one ready and anxious to enter into the political arena, the other
ready and anxious to maintain the traditional "neutrality" and "independence" of the judiciary. The recent litigation surrounding certain
manifestations of secondary picketing dramatically demonstrates that
polarization. But first there is the prelude of two earlier and much vaunted
decisions where the courts intervened to annul the exercise of governmental discretion. The first is Freddie Laker's battle of the Atlantic, Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Department of Trade." The Court of Appeal held that
the Secretary of State could not exercise his prerogative power to amend
and effectively revoke the Sky-train license. This power was a power which
could only be exercised in accordance with the words of the enabling
statute, and that statute did not permit the Secretary of State to withdraw
Laker's designation as an authorized carrier under the Bermuda Agreement. Laker was not then a remarkable legal path-breaker. But that decision was seen as a popular judicial tilt at the windmills of Whitehall, and
was even welcomed by some members of Mr. Callaghan's own party.
The case of Secretary of State for Education and Science v. Tameside
Metropolitan B.C.3" was a different kettle of fish. As a result of a local
government election, the Tories gained control of the Tameside local
education authority which then modified its proposals for the education
of eleven-year-old children by deciding to reverse its predecessor's decision and to retain the existing "grammar schools," the admission to which
would continue to be on a selective basis.2 The Secretary of State, who
was a member of Mr. Callaghan's Cabinet, applied to the court for an
order of mandamus requiring the authority to exercise its power in accordance with his directions; and he directed Tameside to abolish this
selective admission procedure.' By statute he had power to do so if he
was "satisfied" that the authority had acted or was proposing to act
"unreasonably" with respect to the exercise of its powers.' The Secretary
of State contended that the local authority was acting unreasonably
because it could not reintroduce and implement, in the time available
before the new school year began, its new selection procedure. He had,
therefore, proper and reasonable doubts about the educational validity
Compare id. with Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principals of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
[1977] Q.B. 643 (1976).
, [19771 A.C. 1014 (1976).
' Id. at 1014-15.
' Id. at 1015.
' Education Act, 1944, 7 & 8 Geo. 6, c. 31, S 68, as amended by Education Act, 1968,
c. 17, S 1(2), reprinted in [1977] A.C. at 1024 (Lord Denning M.R.).
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of the revised Tameside plan." The House of Lords, affirming the Court
of Appeal, held that the Secretary of State's direction was ultra vires.
He had to satisfy himself that the authority was acting unreasonably in
the sense that its conduct was such that no reasonable authority would
or could engage in it, and on the facts that burden was not sustained.
It was irrelevant that the Secretary of State regretted the educational
change and regarded it as misguided.
For many members of the Labour Party, Tameside was worse than
hemlock. It confirmed their old prejudices about the integrity and bias
of English judges. The New Statesman and its cohorts burst at the seams
in righteous indignation. Professor John Griffith of the London School
of Economics pronounced that it killed stone-dead any prospect of a
Socialist administration introducing a Bill of Rights.' In contrast the more
sedate newspapers and journals were fulsome in singing the praises of
"our" impartial judiciary.
Mr. Justice Holmes was in many ways an exceptional man. For example, he never read a newspaper. Most judges do. It is more than possible
that the tabloid strictures of the Left may have made some of them less
ready to take on the legislature when the next battle came a few years
later over secondary picketing. I say some of them because there was
soon to come a conflict of jurisdiction and approach, between the activist
Court of Appeal, led by the indefatigable Lord Denning, and the passive
House of Lords.
The battleground was section 13(1) of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 (now repealed) and the meaning of the phrase: "[a]n act
37
done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute."
Such an act is deemed not to be tortious simply because it induces another
to break or to threaten to break a contract with a third party.' The question at issue was whether and when secondary picketing could ever be
described as an "act done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute." In Express Newspapers Ltd. v. McShane,9 Express Newspapers,
a national daily newspaper, sought an injunction to restrain the defendants, representatives of the National Union of Journalists (N.U.J.), from
inducing Express employees to break their contracts with Express4
Newspapers by refusing to accept material from the Press Association. 1
The N.U.J. had no dispute with Express Newspapers."' Their dispute was
[1977] A.C. at 1018-19.
Griffith, Judges and a Bill of Rights, NEW STATESMAN, Jan. 10, 1975, at 38; Griffith,
Whose Bill of Rights?, NEW STATESMAN, Nov. 14, 1975, at 607.
, Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, c. 52, S 13(1), as amended by Trade Union
and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act, 1976, c. 7, S 3(2).
." Id.

- [1980] A.C. 672 (1979), rev'g [1979] 1 W.L.R. 390 (1978).
40

Id.

41Id.
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with the owners of certain provincial newspapers whose journalists were
on a strike but which were able to go on publishing from copy supplied
by the Press Association.42 The defendants gave evidence that they
honestly believed that the decision to "black" copy from the Press Association to the Express would advance the cause of the striking provincial
journalists by putting pressure on the provincial owners.43 It would be
a serious blow to the morale of the provincial journalists if fellow journalists in London handled Press Association copy; provincial journalists
would then be reluctant to continue the strike.4 Consequently, it was
argued that their action was in "contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute" and protected by section 13(1." 5 The Court of Appeal granted
the injunction; but the House of Lords reversed its decision and discharged
it.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the words "in contemplation or
furtherance of a trade dispute" must be given a narrow construction."
The defendants' conduct in "blacking" Press Association copy to the Express was protected only if it could be said to have a reasonableprospect,
in a practical and objective sense, of furthering their dispute with the
provincial newspapers. As a matter of fact, it could not and did not. The
Court rejected the wider construction that it was enough that the defendants honestly believed that their acts would have that effect. Lord Denning M.R. could not accept that argument.4 7 It would confer on the union
too wide an immunity, and would legitimate unbridled trade union power:
I draw attention to those rules to show the quandary in which they
place a member who is employed by the "Daily Express." Suppose
he disagrees with the "blacking" and wants to go on working normally. He wants to keep to the law and fulfil his contract with his
employers. The leaders of the union order him to break it. He then
has no option. His freedom is taken away. He must obey the union
instead of obeying the law. If he fails to obey the union, he is
automatically guilty of conduct detrimental to the interests of the
union: and for such conduct he can be expelled from the union and
then lose his job, because it is a "closed shop": and he may never
be re-admitted to it or any other "closed shop" in the trade. In short
he can be turned out of his calling-the only calling he knows. That
is a tremendous coercive power vested in the leaders of the union.
So tremendous indeed, that its officers must be careful to keep
themselves within the immunities given to them by Parliament. If
they should overstep the mark, it is the duty of the courts to intervene
so as to protect-so far as they can-the freedom of the individual

42

Id.

41 Id.

at
Id. at
41 Id. at
" [1979]
7 Id. at
4

675.
681 (Lord Wilberforce).
674.
1 W.L.R. 390 (1978).
396 (Lord Denning M.R.).
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under the law-his freedom to choose for himself what he should doto say: "I wish to do my duty by my employers." 8
The other members of the Court were not as frank, and took refuge
behind a smokescreen of formalism.49 They did not think that the facts
raised any fundamental issues of freedom of the press or individual
liberty." The question was simply one of the construction of the words
of the statute; nonetheless they recognized how "fearsome" was the sanction of blacking for the plaintiffs. 5'
The House of Lords, in reversing that judgment, held that the plain
and unambiguous meaning of "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade
dispute" was: did the defendants believe that their conduct furthered a
trade dispute? 2 It was not proper to assume that Parliament could not
have intended so wide an immunity; for the "manifest policy" of the 1974
Act was to exclude trade disputes from the ambit of judicial review. Nor
was it proper to take into account in interpreting those words the damage
which would or might be caused to innocent and disinterested third parties, like the Express. "The function of the court is simply to ascertain
and pronounce upon the purpose with which the act was done."' Lord
Scarman was relieved that "this is the law."' It would be embarrassing
for a court to review tactics pursued in a trade dispute in order to determine whether those tactics were likely to advance a particular party's
side of that dispute. Very clear language would be necessary to persuade him that Parliament meant the courts to be "some sort of a backseat
driver in trade disputes.""
These very different conceptions of the role of the judge in construing
industrial legislation are even more sharply highlighted in a second case
of secondary picketing which followed within months of McShane: Duport
Steels Ltd. v. Sirs." The defendants were members of a trade union in
dispute with the British Steel Corporation (B.S.C.).' In order to put
pressure to make a favourable settlement on B.S.C. and the government,
which is its financial angel, the union decided to extend the strike to
private steel companies even though it had no dispute with them. Once
again the House of Lords reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal
and held that the defendants could not be enjoined from engaging in secon48
"

Id. at 395 (Lord Denning M.R.).
See id. at 398-400 (Lawton L.J.); id. at 400 (Brandon, L.J.).
See, e.g., id. at 398 (Lawton L.J.).
See, e.g., id. at 399 (Lawton L.J.).

, [1980] A.C. 672 (1979).

Id. at 692 (Lord Keith of Kinkel).
Id. at 694 (Lord Scarman).

Id. (Lord Scarman).
Id. (Lord Scarman).

[1980] 1 W.L.R. 142.
Id. at 143.
59 Id.
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dary picketing. They were acting in furtherance of a trade dispute and
were protected by section 13(1). The facts could not be distinguished from
McShane on the ground that the object of the secondary picketing was
political, to bring pressure on the government to intercede with more
cash for B.S.C ° Moreover, there was no residual discretion to grant an
injunction simply because the defendants' action brought great danger
to the economy and life of the country.'
In Duport Steels the philosophies (or prejudices) of the judges were
frankly revealed. The judgments of Lord Denning M.R. and Lawton L.J.
(in the Court of Appeal) stand in sharp contrast to those of Lord Diplock
and Lord Scarman (in the House of Lords). In the Court of Appeal, Lord
Denning M.R. stated:
There is evidence of the disastrous effect which this action will have,
not only on all the companies in the private sector, but on much of
British industry itself.... The turnover in the private sector is about
£80,000,000 a week. If the men are called out in the private sector,
all these companies would have to shut down at enormous loss. Not
only will they have to shut down, but all the firms which they supply
will not be able to carry on with their work. They will not be able
to make their steel. British Leyland, who depend on 80 per cent of
their supplies from the private sector, will have to shut down much
of their works too. Not only that: we will lose trade here in this country, and our competitors abroad will clap their hands in anticipation
of being able to send
their products into England: because our industry
62
is at a standstill.

Lawton L.J. stated:
Why did [the union] want to involve the private sector? The answer
...is clear.... pressure could be brought to bear upon the government. There would be a stoppage of steel going from the private sector to industry; and industry would in consequence grind to a halt.
There would be mass unemployment, and then both workers and
employers would start beseeching the government to intervene.'
In the House of Lords, Lord Diplock stated:
[I]t cannot be too strongly emphasised that the British Constitution,
though largely unwritten, is firmly based on the separation of powers;
Parliament makes the laws, the judiciary interpret them. When Parliament legislates to remedy what the majority of its members at the
time perceive to be a defect or a lacuna in the existing law (whether
it be the written law enacted by existing statutes or the unwritten
common law as it has been expounded by the judges in decided cases),
the role of the judiciary is confined to ascertaining from the words
that Parliament has approved as expressing its intention what that
Id. at
at
Id. at
"Id. at
61 Id.

161-63 (Lord Diplock).
163 (Lord Diplock).
150-51 (Lord Denning M.R.).
154 (Lawton L.J.).
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intention was, and to giving effect to it. Where the meaning of the
statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the judges to
invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to
its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.
In controversial matters such as are involved in industrial relations
there is room for differences of opinion as to what is expedient, what
is just and what is morally justifiable. Under our Constitution it is
Parliament's opinion on these matters that is paramount."

Lord Scarman stated:
But below the surface of the legal argument lurk some profound questions as to the proper relationship in our society between the courts,
the government and Parliament. The technical questions of law pose
(or should pose) no problems. The more fundamental questions are,
however, very disturbing; nevertheless it is upon my answer to them
that I would allow the appeal. My basic criticism of all three judgments
in the Court of Appeal is that in their desire to do justice the court
failed to do justice according to law. When one is considering law in
the hands of the judges, law means the body of rules and guidelines
within which society requires its judges to administer justice. Legal
systems differ in the width of the discretionary power granted to
judges: but in developed societies limits are invariably set, beyond
which the judges may not go. Justice in such societies is not left to
the unguided, even if experienced, sage sitting under the spreading
oak tree.

•.. [I]n the field of statute law the judge must be obedient to the
will of Parliament as expressed in its enactments. In this field Parliament makes, and un-makes, the law: the judge's duty is to interpret
and to apply the law, not to change it to meet the judge's idea of
what justice requires. Interpretation does, of course, imply in the interpreter a power of choice where differing constructions are possible. But our law requires the judge to choose the construction which
in his judgment best meets the legislative purpose of the enactment.
If the result be unjust but inevitable, the judge may say so and invite
Parliament to reconsider its provision. But he must not deny the
statute. Unpalatable statute law may not be disregarded or rejected,
merely because it is unpalatable. Only if a just result can be achieved
without violating the legislative purpose of the statute may the judge
select the construction which best suits his idea of what justice
requires....
Within these limits, which cannot be said in a free society possessing elective legislative institutions to be narrow or constrained, judges,
as the remarkable judicial career of Lord Denning himself shows, have
a genuine creative role. Great judges are in their different ways judicial
activists. But the constitution's separation of powers, or more

Id. at 157 (Lord Diplock). See also N.W.L. Ltd. v. Woods, [1979] 3 All E.R. 614, 621-24
(Lord Diplock).
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accurately functions, must be observed if judicial independence is not
to be put at risk. For, if people and Parliament come to think that
the judicial power is to be confined by nothing other than the judge's
sense of what is right (or, as Selden put it, by the length of the
Chancellor's foot), confidence in the judicial system will be replaced
by fear of it becoming uncertain and arbitrary in its application. Society
will then be ready for Parliament to cut the power of the judges. Their
power to do justice will become more restricted by law than it need
be, or is today.'
It is evident that both Lord Diplock and Lord Scarman reached the
conclusion that the injunction must be discharged with regret if not
distaste. But they saw their duty as Mr. Justice Black saw his duty to
interpret the Constitution: the letter of the statute must prevail if it were
to conflict with an individual's philosophy of liberalism.
Louis Jaffe, in his English and American Judges as Lawmakers, elegantly castigated the English judiciary for meekly surrendering their historic
role as the guardian of individual rights and the bulwark against arbitrary
executive discretion.66 The picture which I have just sketched shows that
the issues are more complex than Jaffe would suggest or accept. It is
very questionable how far English political, social, and legal history can
now be rewritten, without Parliament's blessing and intervention, in order
to endow the judiciary with any greater power to protect "human rights,"
whatever they may be. Lord Denning may be as bold a spirit as John
Marshall, but his is a different ball game, played in a different ball park,
under different rules and at a different time. 7 What is ironic is that the
literal rule of interpretation which was once the instrument of a judiciary
said to be bent on frustrating the will of the legislature should now be
applied to prevent any possibility of a clash between the legislature and
the courts. Of course, labour law is peculiar, sensitive and explosive. Yet
the House of Lords has shown the same "withdrawal symptoms" in other
contexts; for example, when required to consider the ambit of the powers
of investigation conferred by statute on the Inland Revenue. Regina v.
Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Rossminster Ltd.' concerned the
interpretation of section 20c of the Taxes Management Act 1970.69 Under
that statutory provision an Inland Revenue officer may lay an information against a taxpayer before a circuit judge." If the judge is satisfied
from that information that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
11Id. at 168-69 (Lord Scarman).
L. JAFFE, ENGLISH AND AMERICAN JUDGES AS LAWMAKERS (1969).
6 For a conservative description of the judicial role, see DEVLIN, THE JUDGE (1979);
Devlin, Judges and Lawmakers, 39 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1976); Devlin, Judges, Government and
Politics, 41 MOD. L. REV. 501 (1978). See also L. RADCLIFFE, Not in FeatherBeds, in THE LAW
AND ITS COMPASS 67 (1960).
'

[1980] A.C. 952 (1979).
Taxes Management Act, 1970, c. 9, S 20C, as amended by Finance Act, 1976, c. 40, sch. 6.

10Id. § 20C (1).
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that a tax fraud has been committed and that incriminating documents
will be found on the premises of the taxpayer, he can then issue a search
warrant.7 1 In Rossminster warrants were issued to search the homes and
business premises of the plaintiffs. 2 The warrants did not specify any
criminal offence but merely stated that there were reasonable grounds
for suspecting an offence involving fraud. ' The warrants authorized the
officers of the Inland Revenue to seize and remove "anything whatsoever
found there" that they had reasonable cause to believe may be required
as evidence for the purpose of proceedings in respect of such an offence."
Let me give you the facts of Rossminster in the colourful words of Lord
Denning:
It was a military style operation. It was carried out by officers of
the Inland Revenue in their war against tax frauds. Zero hour was
fixed for 7 a.m. on Friday, July 13, 1979. Everything was highly secret.
The other side must not be forewarned. There was a briefing session
beforehand. Some 60 officers or more of the Inland Revenue attended.
They were given detailed instructions. They were divided into teams,
each with a leader. Each team had an objective allotted to it. It was
to search a particular house or office, marked, I expect, on a map:
and to seize any incriminating documents found therein. Each team
leader was on the day to be handed a search warrant authorising him
and his team to enter the house or office. It would be empowered
to use force if need be. Each team was to be accompanied by a police
officer. Sometimes more than one. The role of the'police was
presumably to be silent witnesses: or maybe to let it be known that
this was all done with the authority of the law: and that the
householder had better not resist-or else!
Everything went according to plan. On Thursday, July 12, Mr.
Quinlan, the senior inspector of the Inland Revenue, went to the Central Criminal Court and put before a circuit judge-the Common
Serjeant-the suspicions which the revenue held. The circuit judge
signed the warrants. The officers made photographs of the warrants,
and distributed them to the team leaders. Then in the early morning
of Friday, July 13-the next day-each team started off at first light.
Each reached its objective. Some in London. Others in the Home Counties. At 7 a.m. there was a knock on each door. One was the home
in Kensington of Mr. Ronald Anthony Plummer, a chartered accountant. It was opened by his daughter aged 11. He came downstairs
in his dressing-gown. The officers of the Inland Revenue were at the
door accompanied by a detective inspector. The householder Mr. Plummer put up no resistance. He let them in. They went to his filing
cabinet and removed a large number of files. They went to the safe
and took building society passbooks, his children's cheque books and
passports. They took his daughter's school report. They went to his

bedroom, opened a suitcase, and removed a bundle of papers belong71 Id.

[1980] A.C. 952, 953 (1979).

Id. at 957 (Eveleigh L.J.).

" Id.
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ing to his mother.
They searched the house. They took personal papers
75
of his wife.
The taxpayer sought, in an interlocutory application, to quash the
seizure and to obtain an order for the return of the documents. He argued
that the warrants were not sufficiently specific in that they did not specify
the particular offences committed and that the seizure was on such a scale
and so indiscriminate that the Revenue officers could not possibly have
had reasonable cause to believe that all the documents were required
78
for the purpose of proceedings in respect of such offences.
The Court of Appeal granted a declaration against the Crown, allowing the taxpayer's application. They were shocked by the dawn raid and
viewed with dismay the legislation under whose authority the Revenue
had purported to act. As Browne L.J. said: "The events of this case are
deeply distasteful to my old-fashioned, and perhaps now unfashionable,
instincts." Predictably, Lord Denning M.R. gave scant attention to the
words of the statute. He invoked the ghost of John Wilkes and the seminal
cases on general warrants, which inspired the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution: "Once great power is granted, there is danger
of it being abused. Rather than risk such abuse, it is . . . the duty of
the courts so to construe the statute as to see that it encroaches as little
as possible upon the liberties of the people of England. '' 78 The warrant
was bad; it should have specified the particular offence, and it did not.79
Moreover, it was for the court to determine whether the Revenue officers could have had reasonable cause to believe that the documents
seized might be required as evidence of the alleged offence.' There was
a strong prima facie presumption that many of the documents were not
examined at all, and certainly not in such detail that the officers could
form an opinion of their evidential value." Some may have been examined.
But this was a case of "all or nothing," for there was no way of
distinguishing those documents properly seized from those improperly
seized.2
The House of Lords; Lord Salmon dissenting, once again reversed the
Court of Appeal. The eighteenth century cases on common law search
warrants were irrelevant. It was only the language of the statute which
was critical. The statute envisaged that the warrant could be in general
terms and hence it was not necessary to state a specific criminal offence
involving fraud. Moreover, public interest immunity entitled the Revenue
"5Id. at 968-69 (Lord Denning M.R.).
"s Id. at 972-73 (Lord Denning M.R.).

" Id. at 977 (Browne L.J.).
"' Id. at 972 (Lord Denning M.R.).

' Id. at 974 (Lord Denning M.R.).
o Id. at 975 (Lord Denning M.R.).
81

Id.

' Id. at 976 (Lord Denning M.R.).
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and its officer to refuse to give any reason for their decision to seize the
documents.1 In proceedings for judicial review, the burden was on the
taxpayer to show a prima facie case that the seizure was ultra vires and
that the Revenue officers had no reasonable cause to believe that the
documents seized might be required as evidence in any tax fraud
proceedings." The taxpayer's right to claim damages in a civil action was
not thereby impaired; in that action the burden would be on the Revenue
to show that they had acted reasonably." Lord Diplock thought that this
was an obvious reconciliation of two competing public interests: "that
offences involving tax frauds should be detected and punished; and that
the right of the individual to the protection of the law from unjustified
interference with his use and enjoyment of his private property should
be upheld."88' Lord Scarman admitted that a claim for damages, even
punitive damages, is "cold comfort" for the taxpayerY The public interest
in ferreting out tax frauds is not to be compared with the public interest
"inthe right of men and women to be secure in the privacy of their
homes."88 Yet the letter of the statute was paramount and had to prevail.
In Lord Wilberforce's laconic words: "Many people, as well as the
respondents, think that this process has gone too far; that is an issue
to be debated in Parliament and in the press.""9
Undoubtedly there are English judges who are ready to accept a more
activist judicial role if it would be constitutionally proper to do so. Lord
Scarman has publicly said so.9 I think that this caution is sensible, and
I believe that it is wise that English judges should insist that fundamental constitutional changes must come before they undertake any new
responsibilities. One change must be the enactment of a Bill of Rights.
There are today in the United Kingdom many commentators and politicians, most but not all drawn from the Liberal and Conservative parties,
who actively support a Bill of Rights in one form or another." They are
alarmed by the unbridled power of a sovereign Parliament, controlled
by one of the two major political parties whose policies are becoming more
and more polarized. The conventional and unwritten checks and balances
are too frail a barrier against the "fundamental and irreversible changes"
which a simple political majority can achieve. Fundamental human rights

8

Id. at 999 (Lord Wilberforce) (adopting Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] A.C. 910, 953-54

(Lord Reid)).

8
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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1006-07 (Viscount Dilhorne).
1011 (Lord Diplock).
1007 (Lord Diplock).
1022 (Lord Scarman).

Id. at 997 (Lord Wilberforce).
10 L. SCARMAN, ENGLISH LAW-THE NEW DIMENSION (1974).
11 Q. HAILSHAM, THE DILEMMA OF DEMOCRACY (1978); J. JACONELLI, ENACTING A BILL OF
RIGHTS (1980); P. WALLINGTON & J. MCBRIDE, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND A BILL OF RIGHTS (1976).
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should be enshrined in a Bill of Rights which should be interpreted by
"independent" judges.
But other jurists and politicans see these proposals as nothing more
than a thinly disguised attempt to reintroduce, in a different dress, immutable natural law rights and thereby to repudiate the democratic processes. There are even Americans who warn us against the dangers of
this creeping Blackstonism. Richard Thomas Tench, writing recently in
the Yale Review about the Constitution of the United States and the role
of the Supreme Court,' sees Marshall's "gorgeous gossamer of words"
as having created an awesome power vested in unelected Supreme Court
Justices to veto the powers of elected Congresses and Presidents. 3
Americans are indoctrinated from the cradle to the grave, so Mr. Tench
assures us, to accept the divinity and infallibility of philosopher kings
"reaching down benign hands to protect the individuals' inalienable -but
ill-defined rights."9 The "Supreme Court interpreting an Infallible Document preempts, like a benign dictator, the ultimate power of the people
to govern themselves."95 Tench is a vigorous polemicist, and Bostow,"
Bickel," and more recently Ely" have grappled with these problems in
a far more sophisticated way. But there are many politicians in the U.K.,
not all on the Left of the political spectrum, who will say "Hear! Hear!
Mr. Tench." They would agree that the law can never be the substitute
for politics. Written constitutions and Bills of Rights take political decision out of the hands of politicians, who can be kicked out of office, and
place such decision into the hands of judges, who (in practice) cannot.
"To require a supreme court to make certain kinds of political decisions
does not make those decisions any less political."99 To conceal that truism
in the formalism of the provisions of a Bill of Rights is dangerous subversion; for a Bill of Rights would seek to insulate from the breath of change
institutions and principles which its supporters wish to preserve immaculate. For such politicians, there are no overriding fundamental human
rights; there are simply political claims by individuals and groups.
Here I must state my prejudices. I am afraid that I do not have that
degree of faith in the political process, at least not in the political process
in the United Kingdom in 1981. In the U.K. a majority government can
be elected on a minority of votes; a third party such as the Liberals can
poll 4,305,324 votes (from a poll of just over 29,500,000) and yet gain only
eleven seats (out of 635). Parliamentary constituencies are grossly uneTench, A Chancy Business, This Constitution, 69 YALE REV. 342 (1980).
9 Id. at 346-47.
Id. at 348.
9 Id. at 353.
Bostow, The Democratic Characterof Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1952).
" A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
j. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).

9 Griffith, The Political Constitution, 42 MOD. L. REV. 1, 16 (1979).
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qual in numbers, and Wales and Scotland are overrepresented. Elected
representatives are not bound by any electoral mandates and are chosen
by inner-party cabals. The political pendulum may swing dramatically and
sharply in five years, from a Mrs. Thatcher to a Mr. Wedgwood Benn,
with disastrous results for the country. Then there are the minorities,
who once did not exist. As a nation we have long had a tradition of civilized
tolerance. But it is sad to relate,. as recent events in Brixton, Southall
and Liverpool demonstrate, that that tolerance is under very considerable
strain; the unemployed and racial minorities of the inner cities do not
live in the poet's "green and pleasant land."
It is idle to think that our economic and social problems can be solved
through the magic wand of constitutional change; but constitutional change
should help to create a new temperate climate. Yet that constitutional
change will only come if a real alliance can be forged between the newly
formed Social Democratic Party and the Liberals. It is only these parties
which are committed to constitutional reform, to the introduction of some
form of proportional representation and to a Bill of Rights. But I doubt,
even given a new political Utopia, that a Bill of Rights will be a political
reality.
If a Bill of Rights is enacted, it will, in all probability, follow closely
the European Convention on Human Rights, which the U.K. ratified as
long ago as 1950.00 The Convention set out specific rights that are pro-

tected: for example, the right to life; protection from torture or inhuman
or degrading treatment; protection from slavery; liberty and security of
the person; the right to a fair trial; prohibition of retrospective criminal
offences; the right to respect for private and family life; freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expression; freedom of
peaceful assembly and association; the right to marry and found a family.
The protocols to the Convention mention other rights, including the right
to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, education and free elections.''
There is no due process or equal protection clause akin to that of the
fourteenth amendment. The nearest thing is article 14 which reads as
follows: "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status."'0 2 But only the rights and freedoms "set forth in this Con"' On four occasions, Liberals have attempted unsuccessfully to initiate legislation along
these lines; bills have passed through the House of Lords, only to be killed in the House
of Commons.
"' See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened
for signature Nov. 4, 1950, [1953] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 71 (Cmd. 8969) [hereinafter cited as

Human Rights Convention], reprinted in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 102-15 (10th ed. 1975).
"I Id. art. 14 at 106.
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vention" are protected; so, the Convention does not expressly mention
sexual and racial discrimination, although there is U.K. legislation dealing specifically with that question. Nonetheless, even so limited, article
14 is potentially far-reaching and may well frighten a U.K. Government,
particularly if it knows what the Supreme Court has done with the fourteenth amendment. For example, article 14 could enable the judges to
challenge U.K. social-welfare legislation that provides different retirement
ages for men and women.
Other articles are also dynamite. Article 11 provides that everyone has
"freedom ... to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his
interests," but it says nothing about whether the converse right, namely,
not to join a trade union, is thereby implied." 3 In the U.K., management
and unions can agree that an employee may obtain and retain a particular
job only if he becomes and remains a member of a particular trade union.
This is the so-called "closed shop." (The present Conservative government has not yet gone to the length of outlawing the closed shop, although
it is being pressed to do so; it has only taken steps to provide fuller
safeguards for individual workers affected by the closed shop.) Individuals
who lose their jobs because they refuse to join a union feel, not unnaturally, very strongly on this issue; and three dismissed employees of British
Rail have challenged their dismissal in the European Court, claiming that
a closed shop agreement which was introduced after their employment
infringed articles 9, 11, and 13 of the European Convention. The European Court of Human Rights has recently held the dismissal infringed
article 11.1" But the Court ducked the question whether that article protected an individual's right not to join a union, preferring to rely on the
special facts that the closed shop had been introduced after the employment, that other closed shop agreements had not required existing nonunion employees to join a union, and that more than ninety-five percent
of British Rail employees were members of the designated unions.0 5
The outcry of horror and anguish from the Labour Left and the British
trade unions reverberated through the public media. The Strasbourg court
was condemned as alien, ignorant of the history and role of the British
unions, and insensitive to the delicate balance of British industrial relations. Here was chauvinism triumphant, an eloquent demonstration of how
difficult it would be to persuade some of the electorate to accept a Bill
of Rights.
A second illustration from recent history that demonstrates the sensitivity of the question of a potential Bill of Rights is the legality of
telephone tapping. This arose directly for the first time in England in
Id. art. 11 at 105.
' Case of Young, James and Webster, 44 DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN

RIGHTS ser. A, at 21 (1981).

105
Id. at 21-26.
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1979. In Malone v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (No. 2),106 the
court held that the plaintiff had no statutory or common law right of property, privacy, or confidentiality in respect of conversations on his
telephone lines. Telephones may be tapped on the warrant of the Home
Secretary, personally signed by him. He has no statutory or common law
right to do so, but, by doing so, he does not infringe the citizen's rights.
The citizen has none. England is "a country where everything is permitted except what is expressly forbidden.10 7 Malone also argued that article 8 of the European Convention conferred on him a direct right to have
his "private and family life, his home and his correspondence" respected."°8
The judge, Megarry V.-C., rejected this argument on the ground that the
Convention was a treaty and was not part of English law; it was not
therefore justiciable in an English court."°9 Mr. Malone is now on his way
to Strasbourg and the European Court of Human Rights. Judging from
a previous opinion of that Court, and the comments on it by Megarry
V.-C., he is going to win.' 0 In the Klass case,"' which came from West
Germany, the European Court was convened to determine whether the
German wiretapping legislation provided "adequate and effective
safeguards against abuse." ' The European Court held that in principle
it was desirable that there should be judicial control of wiretapping but
that the German independent board and commission was an adequate
substitute.' Megarry V.-C. had no doubt that the U.K. will be held to
have infringed article 8, and that legislation was an urgent necessity.'
It is still an urgent necessity.
It is easy to see why many British politicians and civil servants who
have hitherto rarely been constrained or irritated by judicial supervision
should view the enactment of a Bill of Rights with an enthusiasm on the
cool side of lukewarm. A U.K. Bill of Rights would have, unlike its European counterpart, U.K. teeth. In contrast, the adverse judgment of the
European Court of Human Rights is only a moral censure although it is
evident that successive governments are increasingly sensitive to the
adverse publicity which inevitably follows. So, it took the intervention
of the European Court before a prisoner acquired the right to consult
a solicitor in relation to contemplated, as distinct from actual, legal proceedings against prison officers."5
11 [1979] 2 All E.R. 620.
"
"'
"'
"'

Id. at 630. See also id. at 638.
Id. at 626, 628-29.
Id. at 626-28.
See id. at 648.

' "Klass" Case, [1978] Y.B.
Rights).
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622 (Eur. Comm. on Human
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I

Id. at 628.

See [1979] 2 All E.R. at 648-49.
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It is not only the politicians and civil servants whose decisions may
be questioned if a Bill of Rights is enacted. So, too, may the common law
of England. In the well-known Thalidomide case," 8 the House of Lords
enjoined The Sunday Times from publishing an article which was designed
to put pressure on the U.K. manufacturer of Thalidomide to make more
generous settlements in favor of the grievously deformed children. Publication would constitute a contempt of court in that it would inhibit the parties from reaching a fair settlement and from enforcing their rights in
court. Fleet Street has always resented the "narrow" interpretation of
the law of contempt, an interpretation designed, so it says, to protect
from the breath of criticism the "independent" judiciary. The inevitable
challenge before the European Court of Human Rights succeeded: the
injunction constituted a breach of article 10 of the European Convention,
namely "the right to freedom of expression."' It is true that article 10
expressly envisages that the exercise of this right may be subject to conditions, in particular those which are "prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society ... for maintaining the authority and impartiality
of the judiciary.""... But, in the opinion of the European Court, the interference with The Sunday Times' freedom of expression was not
necessary to maintain that authority and impartiality."9 When the proscribed article was due to appear in 1972, the Thalidomide litigation had
been dragging on since 1962; some settlements had been reached and most
of the other suits were dormant.10 The public interest in freedom of expression, its right to be fully informed, within article 10, outweighed any
social need to impose conditions or restrictions on The Sunday Times'
right of publication.'2'
Such a decision reflects a different judicial view of the object and hence
the scope of the law of contempt."n But article 10, so interpreted, is wide
enough to affect other areas of private law, for example, to introduce
principles akin to those formulated by the Supreme Court of the United
States in New York Times v. Sullivan.12
There are many other legal questions which will have to be answered
before a Bill of Rights is enacted. If it is enacted, should its interpretation be entrusted to a separate Constitutional Court? Even more important is whether any Bill of Rights could possibly be entrenched so as to
Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1974] A.C. 273 (1973).
1 Sunday Times Case, [1979] Y.B. EuR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTs 402 (Eur. Comm. on

Human Rights).
,, Human Rights Convention, supra note 101, art. 10.
Sunday Times Case, supra note 117, at 404, 406.
' Id. at 402, 406.
' Id. at 408.
Cf. Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1973] 1 Q3. 710 (same case in English
Court of Appeal), rev'd, [19741 A.C. 273 (1973) (House of Lords).
123 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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prevent its repeal by the simple majority of a sovereign Parliament. If
the answer is, as it probably is, no, it will be the moral force of the Bill
which will be its salvation. The longer it remains on the statute book
the greater will be the burden on its political enemies who wish to justify
any repeal or modification of its provisions.
There is a final problem-judges. For it is they who will interpret any
Bill of Rights. The lawyer in the United States has always played a different, and more varied, role in society; floating in and out of law schools,
Wall Street, and the Administration, he brings to constitutional adjudication a breadth of experience and (it is to. be hoped) a vision which a professional lawyer can never enjoy. It is no bad thing that many of the
Justices did not ascend to the Supreme Court on the judicial escalator
of success. In contrast the English barrister, from whose ranks judges
are chosen, is a professional, an expert in black-letter law, drawn (virtually exclusively) from the middle classes, apolitical, conservative and
traditionalist. Not every supporter of a Bill of Rights will find that picture a comforting prospect. Undoubtedly there will be pressure to choose
judges from outside the English Bar, including from solicitors, many of
whom have the same social and cultural failings! The government of the
day will become concerned to nominate politically sympathetic acolytes
whose views on such topics as the "closed shop" are thought to be its
views. Most important, English lawyers will have to think in different
and wider terms, particularly to learn that the object of, and the skills
for, constitutional adjudication are not the same as those necessary for
statutory interpretation. They will have to overcome the horrible shock
that one day they may have to annul an Act of Parliament. Unless they
accept that new responsibility, which is the natural burden of those who
are seen to make decisions which once only Parliament could make, the
Bill of Rights will be a broken reed and the hopes and aspirations of its
Founding Fathers frustrated. This is a real possibility, as a study of the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada's interpreting its former Federal
Bill of Rights quickly reveals.124
There are so many inponderables, so many tank traps which the opponents of any Bill of Rights will say are insurmountable, so many innovations which they say are alien to our constitutional heritage. In all
probability we shall never have the opportunity of trying to refute them;
for the history of third parties, who might let us do so, is a gloomy one
in the United Kingdom. Marbury v. Madison" was decided over 178 years
ago. We, in the United Kingdom, live in a very different world, a world
which is unlikely to accept any surrender of what is conceived to be its
political power to a nonelected professional elite.
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Things may change, however, with the enactment of the new (1982) Charterof Rights.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

